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Bank Insolvency Regimes in the United States and the
United Kingdom
Heidi Mandanis Schooner*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bank insolvency regimes vary widely. First, many countries maintain separate
bank insolvency rules from those that govern insolvency of other firms or
individuals. Other countries have no special regime and rely on their general
insolvency law for bank closure. Second, some countries rely on an administrative
process for bank closure in which the bank supervisor, bank insurer, or other agency
has the power to appoint the conservator or receiver, and, in some instances, may
appoint itself to the job. Other countries rely on a judicial process in which the bank
supervisor (or bank managers or creditors) must apply to the court for the
appointment of a conservator or receiver.
A comparison of the United States and United Kingdom bank insolvency
regimes reflects many of the different approaches used throughout the world. The
U.K. system relies on general insolvency law for the closure of banks. The system is
judicial in that a court decides whether a bank is insolvent and insolvency is the only
basis for closing the bank. In contrast, the U.S. system for bank closure is
administrative and derives from banking law. Bank supervisors determine
insolvency, and under some circumstances may close even a solvent bank.
. The differences between the two approaches are fundamental and stem from the
underlying purpose and function of general insolvency law, as opposed to the system
of bank supervision. While the fair treatment and protection of the insolvent firm's
creditors grounds insolvency law, banking supervision grows out of systemic
concerns, and its fundamental aim is not the protection of individual creditors. An
International Monetary Fund ("IMF') report summarizes the dilemma:
An extrajudicial regulatory process offers greater efficiency than a court-
administered process; this is an important advantage if immediate action to
close or transfer the business of a bank is required for systemic reasons.
However, granting the regulator the power to act expeditiously and to avoid
delays inherent in court administration has a significant cost: excluding the
courts tends to deprive bank creditors and other interested parties of the
procedural and substantive safeguards that they enjoy under a proper court-
administered proceeding. This argument carries even greater weight in bank
insolvencies where the deposit insurance agency is appointed receiver, as the
agency will usually suffer a conflict between its interests as one of the
largest creditors of the bank and its role as impartial receiver.'
* Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
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II. STRUCTURE OF INSOLVENCY REGIMES IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
All forms of prudential bank regulation, of course, are ultimately tied to
preventing insolvency. Such regulation is generally justified on the basis of the
systemic implications of bank failure. The discussion below focuses on
regulatory intervention in cases where the bank is already insolvent (although
some of the regulatory powers discussed may be triggered prior to insolvency).
Other types of regulatory intervention such as open bank financial support or
regulatory enforcement actions often precede such cases. One option discussed
below is the appointment of an administrator or conservator. This course of
action is appropriate in situations in which drastic measures are appropriate, but
where there remains hope for the ongoing survival of the institution. The
administration order or conservatorship draws a close parallel to the U.S. Chapter
11 bankruptcy. The other option is the receivership. The institution of the
receivership proceedings is for the ultimate purpose of closing the bank. The
receivership can be compared with the U.S. Chapter 7 bankruptcy, in which
liquidating assets is the goal, although the way in which the closure is achieved
can vary considerably.
A. Administration Orders and Conservatorships
Generally, the purpose of the administration order (sometimes called
provisional administration) or a conservatorship is to: (1) rehabilitate
incompetent management and operations so that the bank can survive as an
ongoing concern; or (2) preserve all or part of the bank's assets so that the bank
may be sold or merged with another institution. The advantages of the
administration order are not always available. A recent IMF study observed:
In several countries the law does not provide for regulatory provisional
administration. One practical reason may be that the bank regulator
simply lacks the staff resources to manage a bank or to supervise the
management of a bank by an administrator. This argument is more
serious than it may seem at first glance. Bank regulators are not in the
business of managing and operating banks but of exercising prudential
banking supervision. Prudential banking supervision is not the same as
bank management, and bank regulators do not necessarily have the
qualifications, experience, or even the temperament required of a
successful bank manager. Provisional administration lends itself to
abuse. For instance, provisional administration has been used to postpone
the inevitable closure of banks, owing to political pressure or because the
11 (2001), at http://www.imf.org/external/pulas/nft/2001/lart/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
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deposit insurance system lacked the funds to pay off depositors.
Obviously, the use of provisional administration to mask forbearance is
likely to worsen the condition of the banks concerned and to increase the
costs associated with their resolution that will be borne by the state and
by their creditors.
Finally, yet not less important, in most countries with provisional
administration for banks, bank owners largely retain their rights. As a result,
they could frustrate a provisional administration. Therefore, the appointment
of a receiver whose powers exceed those of the provisional administrator and
typically include those of the bank's owners is often preferred. 2
The U.K. Financial Services Authority ("FSA") lacks the authority to take
control of a troubled bank. Rather, the FSA, the bank or its directors, or the
firm's creditors may apply to the court for the appointment of an administrator.
The court may make an administration order if the court "is satisfied that a
company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts."3 The inability to pay
debts is determined under two tests: (1) the balance sheet test: "where it is proved
to the satisfaction of the court that the value of the company's assets is less than
the amount of its liabilities, taking into account its contingent and prospective
liabilities;" and (2) the cash flow or liquidity test: "if it is proved to the
satisfaction of the court that the company is unable to pay its debts as they fall
due."4 With regard to banks, this requirement is satisfied if the bank is in default
on a payment obligation.' Other grounds for the appointment of an administrator
include the court's determination that the appointment would realize the survival
of the company as an ongoing concern or a more advantageous realization of the
company's assets.6
The court-appointed administrator has broad powers and "may do all such
things as may be necessary for the management of the affairs, business and
property of the company. ' These powers include the ability to remove officers
and directors and appoint new ones, but do not include the power to act on behalf
of shareholders.
The FSA considers many factors in determining whether to seek an
administration order or, as discussed below, a compulsory winding up order. In
general, in seeking an insolvency order, the FSA will consider the needs of the
2. Id. at 122.
3. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45 pt. H § 8(1)(a) (Eng.), available at www.insolvencyhelpline.co.uk/
insolvency-act/ial986.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) [hereinafter "Insolvency Act 1986].
4. Id. § 123.
5. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, § 359(3) and (4), at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/
acts2000/00008-ai.htm#359 (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
6. Insolvency Act 1986, supra note 3, § 8(3).
7. Id. § 14(a).
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consumers and its regulatory objectives.' More specifically, the FSA will
consider, among other things, whether the bank or any creditor or consumer is
taking steps to deal with the bank's insolvency; whether the FSA's actions will
result in better consumer protection; the nature and extent of the bank's assets
and liabilities; whether there will be significant cross border effects to an
insolvency order; and whether there is a risk of certain creditors being preferred.9
In sharp contrast to the U.K. system, U.S. bank supervisors may appoint the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") as conservator. The FDIC may
appoint itself as conservator based on the statutory standards for appointment and
to prevent a loss to the deposit insurance fund.' As in the United Kingdom, the
statutory grounds for appointment of a conservator include the balance sheet and
liquidity insolvency tests. In addition, however, the statutory grounds also
include: substantial dissipation of assets or earnings (due to a violation of law or
any unsafe or unsound practice); an unsafe or unsound condition; willful
violation of an administrative cease and desist order; concealment of the bank's
records from the bank supervisor; losses that have or will likely deplete all or
substantially all of the banks capital; undercapitalization; and guilt of certain
money laundering offenses." While judicial review is available for the
appointment of a conservator or receiver, courts give substantial deference to the
administrative determination overturning the decision only if it is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."' 2
The powers of the FDIC as conservator are extensive. As conservator, the
FDIC may take any action: "(i) necessary to put the insured depository institution
in a sound and solvent condition; and (ii) appropriate to carry on the business of
the institution and preserve and conserve the assets and property of the
institution.' 3 Notably, the FDIC has the power to prescribe regulations regarding
the conduct of its own conservatorships or receiverships and can prescribe rules
that allow the FDIC to exercise any function normally held by a shareholder,
officer or director of the institution. 4 Moreover, the FDIC, as conservator or
receiver, has statutory authority to merge a bank with another bank.
8. FSA HANDBOOK, CHAPTER 10: INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS AND ORDERS AGAINST DEBT AVOIDANCE,
10.6.5, Release 034, Sept. 2004, at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/handbook/BL3ENFpp/ENF/chapter 
_I0.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2005) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
9. Id.
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(10).
11. Id. § 1821(c)(5).
12. See Franklin Sav. Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F. 2d 1127, 1142 (10th Cir. 1991).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(D).
14. Id. § 1821(d)(1), (2)(C).
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B. Receivership and Winding-Up
In England and Wales,'" a bank's creditors may apply to the court for the
appointment of a receiver for the purpose of winding up under the same
standards that apply to the appointment of an administrator.'6 If the receiver
applies to the court for directions with regard to the performance of any of the
functions of the receiver, the FSA has the right to be heard upon such
application.' 7 The FSA may petition the court for an order directing the receiver
to file reports or give notices or pay payments to a liquidator.'8 Finally, the
receiver must notify the FSA if the company is engaging in regulated activities
without authorization.' 9
In the United Kingdom, the FSA may petition the court for a compulsory
winding up order (i.e., liquidation) and the court may wind up the bank if it is
unable to pay its debts (according to the same definition as used in the
appointment of an administrator) or if the court determines that it is just and
equitable to do so.20 The FSA may also participate in the voluntary winding-up of
a bank.2'
In the United States, the procedure and grounds for the appointment of a
receiver are generally the same as for the appointment of a conservator. When the
receiver is appointed for the purpose of liquidation or winding up, the receiver
must be the FDIC.22 The powers of the receiver are the same as that of a
conservator, except that the receiver also has the power to place the bank into
liquidation "having due regard to the conditions of credit in the locality. 23
The U.S. special insolvency regime for banks imposes unique rules with
regard to the distribution of the banks assets and liabilities. While secured
creditors maintain their priority to the extent of their security, depositors receive
priority over other unsecured creditors. The FDIC has the authority to impose
liability for losses of a failed bank on other commonly controlled banks (e.g.,
within the same bank holding company).25 In addition, the FDIC has broad
authority to repudiate contracts of an insolvent bank that were executed prior to
conservatorship or receivership, if the contracts are burdensome and repudiation
15. See Insolvency Act 1986, supra note 3, § 32 (stating the Act has separate rules for receiverships in
Scotland).
16. Id.
17. FSMA 2000, supra note 5, § 363(2), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/ acts2000/20000
008.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
18. Id. § 363(3).
19. Id. § 364.
20. Id. § 367.
21. Id. § 365.
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii).
23. Id. § 1821(d)(1)(E).
24. Id. § 1821(d)(l1)(A).
25. Id. § 1815(e).
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will promote the orderly administration of the bank's affairs.26 The damages
owed by the FDIC in the case of a repudiation are limited to "actual direct
compensatory damages, 27 which excludes punitive or exemplary damages,
damages for lost profits or opportunity, and damages for pain and suffering.
28
During the 1990s, the FDIC used its repudiation power to avoid payment under
employment severance agreements, arguing that the losses under such
agreements were not actual direct compensatory damages. The courts' review of
the FDIC position in such cases was mixed.2 ' Finally, the FDIC also enjoys
immunity from certain claims and defenses regarding the assets of a failed bank
under a doctrine originating from a U.S. Supreme Court decision, D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co.3° The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and its
statutory correlary3' have been the source of much scrutiny by courts and
commentators.32
C Regulatory Forbearance
Despite any formal or informal authority on the part of bank regulators to
take significant and early action to address bank failure, powerful incentives push
regulators to do nothing. Almost all of the constituents involved have reasons to
avoid or delay the bank closure. Bank shareholders wish to avoid a fire sale of
the bank's assets. Depositors, even if fully insured, wish to avoid dirupting their
banking services. Bank directors and employees wish to retain their jobs. Bank
supervisors and insurers seek to avoid costly payouts to depositors, the costs of
liquidation, and the public exposure of regulatory failure. Lawmakers want to
avoid any bad news on their watch, and a bank failure is headline bad news. Even
general creditors and uninsured depositors may prefer methods other than closure
to protect their interests. For example, such creditors may hope that the insolvent
bank is purchased by a healthy one or that it receives some public assistance to
avoid insolvency. Thus, the incentives all point away from bank closure. Yet,
history has shown that early closure of insolvent institutions is often the least
costly method of resolution.
A significant contrast between the U.S. and U.K. systems for bank
insolvency is that the U.S. system has adopted formal rules to prevent
forbearance, and the United Kingdom has no such formal rules. In the United
States, Congress recognized that regulatory forbearance was a contributor to the
26. Id.. § 1821(e).
27. Id. § 1821(e)(3)(A)(i).
28. Id. § 1821(e)(3)(B).
29. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Refocusing Regulatory Limitations on Banks' Compensation Practices,
37 B.C. L. REV. 861 (1996).
30. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
31. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
32. See PATRICIA A. McCoy, BANKING LAW MANUAL § 16.04 (2002) (discussing the D'Oench Duhme
doctrine comprehensively).
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length and extent of the 1980s savings and loan crisis. Thus, in 1991, Congress
created a system of formalized rules preventing regulatory forbearance. Prompt
corrective action rules require bank regulators to place critically undercapitalized
institutions in conservatorship or receivership within ninety days, unless the
supervisor and the FDIC determine that other action would better serve the
purposes of the statute.33 Such determination may only be made if the bank: (1)
has a positive net worth; (2) is in substantial compliance with an approved capital
restoration plan; (3) is profitable or has an upward trend in earnings; and (4) has
reduced its ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. Moreover, the exception
to mandatory conservatorship or receivership only applies if the head of the
appropriate banking agency and the chairman of the bank's board certify that the
institution is viable and not expected to fail.34 Critically undercapitalized banks
are subject also to certain mandatory operating constraints such as prohibitions
on paying excessive compensation or bonuses.35 Prompt corrective action rules
also impose significant requirements (although not mandatory closure) on banks
that are deemed either significantly undercapitalized or undercapitalized. For
example, any undercapitalized institution must submit an acceptable capital
restoration plan.36
III. UNDERSTANDING DIVERGENT REGIMES
Despite globalization and the expectation of, or hope for, convergence of
regulatory systems, national regimes remain distinct. In the case of the U.S. and
U.K. bank insolvency regimes, some of the reasons for divergence are quite clear
and enduring.
The extensiveness of deposit insurance is unique in the United States. No
other country comes close to the $100,000 in insurance coverage provided by the
FDIC. The FDIC administers deposit insurance funds that must be maintained at
not less than 1.25 percent of the total estimated insured deposits. As of 2003, the
Bank Insurance Fund balance stood at more than $34 billion and the Savings
Association Insurance Fund balance at more than $12 billion.37 Overall, the FDIC
38insures well over $3 trillion in deposits. The size of insured deposits make the
FDIC the largest potential stakeholder in a banking crisis. This stakeholder status
may justify the FDIC's extensive involvement in bank insolvencies. Moreover,
the protection of the deposit insurance funds justifies the super receivership
powers granted to the FDIC.
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1831(h)(3).
34. Id. § 1831(h)(3)(c)(ii).
35. Id. § 1831(i).
36. Id. § 1831(e)(2).
37. FDIC ANNUAL REPORT 2003, at 43, 63, available at http:/!www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/
2003annualreport/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
38. Id. at23.
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Prior to 1982, the United Kingdom had no formal system for deposit
insurance. 39 Today, the United Kingdom's deposit insurance scheme reflects the
strong influence of the EU ("European Union") Deposit Guarantee Directive.
The U.K. Financial Services Compensation Scheme offers deposit insurance, but
the FSCS has no role in bank insolvency. Deposits are insured 100 percent for
the first £2,000 and then for 90 percent of the next £33,000. The levy on banks
for deposit coverage may not exceed 0.3 percent of covered deposits.
The nature of the bank industries in the United States versus the United
Kingdom must also have an impact on the bank insolvency regime. The U.S.
banking industry is populated by many banks (although dominated by a few), and
the industry experienced widespread failures twice in the last century. The U.K.
banking industry is limited to a handful of banks, and bank failures have been
rare. Both countries can be accused (or applauded, depending on one's
perspective) for employing "too big to fail" policies, but in the United Kingdom
almost any bank is too big to fail. In the United Kingdom, therefore, there is a
greater incentive to avoid the insolvency regime entirely and, instead, use
informal and formal regulatory power to resolve troubled institutions without
resort to the insolvency regime. In the United States, it is perhaps more inevitable
that, each year, some banks will fail. In 2003, the FDIC resolved three bank
failures. That year, the United States had 9,182 insured depository institutions. In
an industry structure like that in the United Kingdom, it is perhaps less important
to establish a special insolvency regime that provides extraordinary power to
bank supervisors. Bank failures do not occur often, therefore, there is no urgency
for a special regime. U.S. regulators resort routinely to special insolvency rules.
Finally, the overall differences in the respective countries' approach to bank
regulation are reflected in the insolvency regimes. ° Historically, the United
States has maintained a formal system of controls over the banking industry.
Bank activities have been constrained and highly regulated, and the system of
regulation is formalized through statutes and regulations. In the United Kingdom,
the history of bank regulation reflects a more informal system and only light
control on activities. With regard to insolvency, the U.S. system reflects a highly
specialized and thoroughly formal system (e.g., prompt corrective action rules)
that grants extraordinary authority and discretion to bank regulators. In the
United Kingdom, there is no special bank insolvency regime, and the FSA has
much less formal control over the process. This means that the FSA's real power
is likely to be informal and subject to far less legislative control.
39. See ANDREW CAMPBELL & PETER CARTWRIGHT, BANKS IN CRISIS 177-94 (2002) (discussing
deposit insurance in the United Kingdom and the United States). In contrast, New York established a deposit
insurance system in 1828. Id.
40. See generally Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The
Case of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 595 (1999).
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IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL REGIMES IN
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES
The failure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce ("BCCI") serves as the icon for
the challenges involved in cross-border insolvencies. BCCI, based in Luxembourg,
operated in more than seventy countries, and national differences took their toll on
the resolution of the insolvency. For example, Luxembourg liquidators attempted to
consolidate all of BCCI's assets into a single pool for distribution to creditors
worldwide. This approach was opposed by New York and California state banking
supervisors who ultimately prevailed in maintaining control over BCCI assets in
those states. This "ring-fence" approach led to inequality in treatment of BCCI
creditors. Ring-fencing appears provincial. It does, however, serve to protect
creditors of foreign branches; and those creditors might otherwise be disfavored by
the home country supervisor. Moreover, it protects foreign branch creditors from the
41
results of lax regulation by the home country supervisor.
Quite contrary to the U.S. approach, the EU Directive on the Reorganisation and
Winding Up of Credit Institutions ("the Directive")42 is formulated on the single-
entity, home country rule principles. Under the Directive, with regard to banks within
the European Union, insolvency matters will be governed under the law of the bank's
home Member State.43 This means that the same set of insolvency rules will apply to
all branches in host countries within the EU and, therefore, all creditors will be
treated equally, i.e., in accordance with the same set of rules. In cases in which the
insolvency bank has its head office outside of the EU and has branches in at least two
member states, the Directive provides that the member states "shall endeavour to
coordinate their actions" with regard to resolution." The Directive was brought into
force in the United Kingdom by the Credit Institutions (Reorganisations and
Winding up) Regulations 2004.
Of course, the resolution of BCCI would have looked quite different had the
Directive been in force at the time. Within the EU, Luxembourg would have been the
home Member State and would have conducted the resolution. Significantly, the
approach in the EU has not been one that sought (quite understandably) to dictate
many changes in the substantive insolvency law in the member states. Rather, the
home country rule principle accommodates national differences while providing a
unifying principle. In this way, the Directive serves as a testament to the enduring
nature of national insolvency regimes.
41. See RAJ K. BHALA, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AFTER BCCI 301-302 (1994).
42. Council Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4th April 2001 on
the Reorganisation and Winding-Up of Credit Institutions, 2001 O.J. (L 125/15), available at http://secretariat.
eftc.int/Web/EuropeanEconomicArea/EEAAgreement/annexes/annex9.pdf (noting member states were required
to comply with the Directive by May 5, 2004).
43. Home Member State is defined at Article 1, point (6) of Directive 2000/12/EC.
44. Directive 2001/24/EC, supra note 42, art. 8.
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V. CONCLUSION
The divergent bank insolvency regimes in the United States and United
Kingdom reflect the more general approaches to bank regulation in those
countries. Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages. The U.S. systems
gives bank supervisors the power to act swiftly and decisively with regard to
troubled banks and gives supervisors tremendous flexibility with regard to forms
of resolution. On the other hand, the U.S. regime grants tremendous regulatory
authority at the expense of bank creditors' rights. The U.K. system is quite
equitable in its treatment of creditors and avoids supervisory overreaching
through its reliance on a judicial process. On the other hand, the judicial process
might fail to afford maximum speed and flexibility in a crisis.
The importance of national differences is plain in the case of cross border
insolvencies. While the adoption of international standards for cross border
insolvencies may be abstractly ideal, general convergence on bank regulatory
issues has been slow, indeed, with the main success in capital regulation. The
home country approach adopted in the EU addresses problems of coordination
without requiring major substantive changes to any member states' insolvency
law. Whether the home country principle will extend beyond the EU is both hard
to imagine and hard not to.
